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Abstract   2
This paper examines the technical efficiency of Argentinean pension funds 
management companies using a random stochastic frontier model to rank the pension 
funds management companies, taking into account heterogeneity in the data. The 
empirical findings reveal that efficiency measures have a significant effect on 
pension funds efficiency. The implications for managers and policy makers are 
discussed. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Pension funds efficiency depends strongly on competition and the regulation 
environment, which may result in incentives for consolidation and portfolio 
restrictions. Active investment management helps to keep markets efficient and to 
ensure the flow of funds to the most successful enterprises, as well as playing a 
major role in the allocation of resources within the economy (see Bauer, Koedijk and 
Otten, 2005). Pension funds management companies are particularly important in 
this respect in contemporary economies given the increase in the size of the aged and 
retired populations and the consequent problems in guaranteeing the financial 
sustainability of social security (Davis, 1995).  
In this paper, we analyse the technical efficiency of Argentinean pension 
funds management companies using quarterly data from 1996Q2 to 2007Q1 with a 
random stochastic frontier model. Stochastic frontier models are common in 
contemporary research, Farsi, Filippini and  Kuenzle (2005),  Kim and Lee (2006), 
Delgado and Álvarez (2007),  Peng and Wang (2007), Kraft, Hofler and Payne 
(2006), Berg and Lin (2007) and Giannakas,  Tran and Tzouvelekas (2003) among 
others. 
Previous research on the performance of pension fund management 
companies has relied on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models or homogenous 
frontier models, including the studies by Barrientos and Boussofiane (2005), who 
apply the DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC models to Chilean data; Barros and Garcia 
(2007), who analyse Portuguese data using a homogeneous stochastic frontier model, 
and Barros and Garcia (2006), who estimate four DEA models of Portuguese pension 
funds. The paper contributes to this area of the literature by estimating a stochastic   4
frontier model for the Argentinean case which enables us to take into account 
heterogeneity in the data. The advantages of this approach are twofold. First, it 
allows for an error term combining different statistical distributions, which is an 
improvement on alternative specifications that rely on one specific distribution. 
Second, it allows for random parameters (that is, parameters that describe 
characteristics not linked to observed characteristics, unlike the traditional frontier 
that allows for variations related to observed characteristics). This procedure may be 
more effective at achieving results than the traditional procedure, which considers all 
pension funds to be homogeneous. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to estimate a 
stochastic frontier model disentangling heterogeneous and homogeneous explanatory 
variables to identify those variables which can be managed homogeneously and those 
that must be managed by segments. 
  Our analysis is motivated by some interesting features of Argentinean 
pension funds management companies. Firstly, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are 
present in the market during the period under examination, which indicates a 
constant effort by these companies to increase their market share. Secondly, 
regulation restricts their discretionary power, trying to influence their adoption of 
efficient procedures. Regulation could be understood as a mimic of competition in 
these markets, where the asymmetry of information demands intervention. In other 
regulated industries, such as utilities in developed and developing countries, price 
caps are set periodically. They work as a double-edged device: first they protect 
consumers in non-competitive markets, and second they guarantee producers the 
stability to improve their efficiency via cost reductions that they can appropriate as 
profits until the next price setting. One procedure adopted for improving 
competitiveness is benchmarking, based on research of an industry’s best practices   5
and on the idea that the widespread application of these practices can lead to 
improved performance throughout the industry. Benchmarking is currently not 
applied in the pension management industry, but it could be, as we suggest in the 
next section, since the price (commission) cap in the Argentinean market has recently 
been set. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. 
Section 3 surveys the relevant literature on this topic, while Section 4 presents the 
theoretical framework. Section 5 discusses the data and the empirical findings. 
Section 6 considers the implications of this study for managers and policy makers, 
and concludes. 
 
2.   Contextual Setting 
Major changes in pension funds were implemented in a dozen Latin American 
countries following the Chilean reform in 1981. The new arrangements share a 
mandatory fully funded pillar organized in individual accounts, which in some cases 
replaced and in others supplemented reformed pay-as-you-go systems (Mesa-Lago, 
2004).  
Argentina reformed its old pay-as-you-go system in 1994 and introduced a 
mixed system, comprising a new pay-as-you-go scheme and a fully funded one. 
Pension Funds Management Companies (PFMC) administer closed-end pension 
funds, where individuals hold their savings until retirement. The PFMC compete for 
new affiliates who are free to choose between both systems (pay-as-you-go and fully 
funded), and also compete for the affiliates within the fully funded system since 
regular contributors can switch PFMC twice a year. Until recently, commissions 
were deregulated. The funds at the time of retirement could be employed to buy an   6
annuity from an insurance company or to structure a phased withdrawal. A public 
universal benefit is common to pay-as-you-go and fully funded schemes, and the 
recognition of contributions to the old system is made by means of a supplemental 
benefit (instead of a recognition bond as in Chile and other Latin American 
countries). A recent reform in 2007 restored the possibility (closed in 1996) for 
active workers to choose between the two systems, and established the default option 
for pay-as-you-go for new entrants into the labour market, who are undecided about 
their affiliation. The system also provides disability and survivor benefits, until 
recently through collective life insurance and since 2008 through a mutual 
arrangement between PFMC (Ferro, 2003 and Law 26222/07). 
The PFMC are heavily regulated, as in other Latin American reforms 
(Demaestri and Ferro, 2004). The portfolios of the pension funds face several 
constraints on their composition, and a minimum return rule (0.7 times the average of 
the system) must be accomplished. A ceiling of 20 per cent on foreign assets is 
mandatory. One half of the portfolio is allocated to local public debt. At February of 
2008, the ten PFMC in the market managed about 20 billion euros of eleven million 
workers. The Argentinean government defaulted on its debt in 2002, and a “haircut” 
of about 40 per cent was applied on public securities in the PFMC portfolios in a 
swap operation (Ferro and Romero, 2006). 
The market of pension funds currently has 11 PFMC, but it registered 25 
when it began to function in July 1994. Sixteen firms merged with other PFMC, and 
just one new entrant initiated operations after the introduction of the fully funded 
system. 
The expenditures of PFMC include staff (some administrative but 
fundamentally commercial), software, premises, marketing, custody services, and a   7
fee to the Federal Tax Administration for collection services. Until the reform of 
2007, they also had to buy collective insurance for disability and survivor benefits 
from insurers insurance firms, but this arrangement was changed to a scheme 
whereby all PFMC apply a uniform fee of 0.3 per cent monthly on accumulated 
funds, and the risk is covered on a mutual basis. The commission for funds 
management remains, as in the 13 initial years of the reform, as a percentage of 
salary flows (which contributes 11 per cent monthly). Commissions were set at 1 per 
cent of wage flows in the reform of 2007 and the Executive Power can reduce this 
figure, but the law is imprecise about the commission resetting methodology.  
The efficiency frontier analysis can be a useful tool for collecting efficiency 
gains and pass through these gains to the affiliates, using a similar process to the X 
factor in utilities industries in several countries (Sibley, 1989). 
 
3.   Literature Review 
Although the existing literature is vast, only a small number of papers examine 
technical efficiency in pension funds, Garcia (2004). Braberman et al. (1999) analyse 
Argentinean pension funds management institutions using a Translog cost frontier 
model applied to quarterly data from 1997Q2 to 1998Q1. A changing number of 
pension funds management institutions are used in the analysis. Operating costs are 
regressed on three independent variables: the number of members/participants; the 
positive transferences/turnover (participant switching from one management 
institution to another) corrected in accordance with the proportion of participant 
employees of the pension funds management institution; and the profitability of the 
fund. Two dummy variables were included to take into account the changes in   8
regulations after November 1997. Regulation was found to increase total costs but 
not to affect significantly relative efficiency.  
Barrientos and Boussofiane (2005) analyse Chilean pension funds 
management companies carrying out Data envelopment analysis (DEA), and 
adopting a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the DEA efficiency scores are 
calculated, and, in the second stage, they are regressed on appropriate variables. 
Specifically, they used two outputs (total revenue and the number of contributors), 
and three inputs (marketing and sales costs, office personnel and executive pay, and 
administration and computing costs). In the second stage, they estimated a regression 
of the DEA scores on a constant, market share, sales, the ratio of contributors to 
affiliates, and revenue. They concluded that there is no continuous trend towards an 
improvement in technical efficiency. An analysis of the determinants of efficiency 
shows that an increase in market share contributes positively to technical efficiency, 
whilst sales and marketing costs are detrimental.  
Barros and Garcia (2006) analyse the same sample with four DEA models, 
concluding that traditional DEA models are unable to discriminate adequately 
between Portuguese pension funds. Finally, Barros and Garcia (2007) analyse the 
efficiency of a sample of Portuguese pension funds with a homogeneous stochastic 
frontier model.  Therefore, the present paper, based on a stochastic frontier model, 
represents an original contribution to this area of literature. As explained above, the 
advantages are the disentangling of homogenous and heterogeneous variables in the 
frontier model. 
A related literature on pension funds are Olivares ((2008), Marti, Matallín and 
Fernandez (2008) Dominguez-Barrero and López – Laborda (2007). 
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4. Theoretical Framework 
Our framework is based on two strands of the literature: models of industry 
efficiency and stochastic frontier models. 
4.1. Models of Industry Efficiency 
Two competing models of industry efficiency exist in the literature. The strategic-
group theory (Caves and Porter, 1977) explains differences in efficiency scores as 
being due to differences in the structural characteristics of units within an 
industry, which in turn lead to differences in performance. In the case of the 
pension funds management company, units with similar asset configurations 
pursue similar strategies with similar results in terms of performance (Porter, 
1979). As there are different strategic options to be found in the different sectors 
of an industry, because of mobility impediments, not all options are available to 
each pension funds management company, causing a spread in the efficiency 
scores of the industry. By contrast, the resource-based theory (Barney, 1991; 
Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) accounts for different efficiency scores in terms 
of heterogeneity of resources and capabilities on which retailers base their 
strategies. These may not be perfectly mobile across the industry, resulting in a 
competitive advantage for the best-performing retailers.  
Purchasable assets cannot be considered to represent sources of sustainable 
efficiency. Indeed, critical resources are not available in the market. Rather, they 
are built up and accumulated on the pension funds management company’s 
premises, their non-imitability and non-substitutability being dependent on the 
specific traits of their accumulation process. The difference in resources thus 
results in barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and in the pension fund managers’ 
inability to alter their accumulated stock of resources over time. In this context,   10
unique assets are seen as exhibiting inherently different levels of efficiency; 
sustainable profits are ultimately a return on the unique assets owned and 
controlled by the pension funds management company (Teece et al., 1997).  
 
4.2 Stochastic Frontier Models 
We adopt the stochastic cost frontier approach. This approach, first proposed by 
Farrell (1957), came into prominence in the late 1970s as a result of the work of 
Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and Meeusen and Van 
den Broeck (1977). 
The frontier is estimated econometrically, and the difference between the 
inefficient units and the frontier is measured by the residuals. This is an intuitive 
approach based on traditional econometrics. By assuming that the residuals have two 
components (noise and inefficiency), we can obtain the stochastic frontier model. 
Therefore, the main issue is the decomposition of the error terms. Let us present the 
model more formally.  The general frontier cost function proposed by Aigner et al. 
(1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) is the following: 
(1)                    1,2,    t  N, 1,2,     i     ;   ). ( T it u it v
e it C it C … = … =
+
= x  
where Cit and xit represent a scalar cost and a vector of variables including the input 
prices and the output descriptors present in the cost function of the decision-unit i 
under analysis in the t-th period, respectively. The error term  it u it v it + = ε  has two 
components: uit, representing technical inefficiencies and assumed to be positive and 
normally distributed with zero mean and variance
2
u σ , and vit, namely the traditional 
error term of econometric models, assumed to be  independently and identically 
distributed, representing the effect of random shocks (noise) and being independent   11
of  uit. The positive disturbance uit has a half-normal independent distribution 
truncated at zero, indicating that the cost for each funds management company must 
lie on or above its cost frontier. This implies that any deviation from the frontier is 
caused by management factors controlled by the pension funds management 
company.  
Using  2
v σ  and  2
u σ  to denote the variance of the traditional error term v and 
the inefficiency term u, respectively, the total variance of the error term is given by 
2 2 2
u v σ σ σ + =  . The contributions of the error and inefficiency terms to the total 
variance are  ) 2 1 /( 2 2 λ σ σ + = v and  ) 2 1 /( 2 2 2 λ λ σ σ + = u , respectively, where λ 
provides an indication of the relative contribution of u and v to  v u + = ε  and is 





λ = . 
Because estimation procedures of equation (1) yields only the residual, ε, but 
not the inefficiency term u, the latter must be calculated indirectly (Greene, 2003). In 
the case of panel data, as in this paper, Battese and Coelli (1988) use the conditional 
expectation of uit, conditioned on the realised value of the error term, 
) ( it u it v it + = ε , as an estimator of uit. In other words,  [ ] it it u E ε /  is the mean 
productive inefficiency for the ith pension funds management company at any time t.  
However, inefficiency can also be due to heterogeneity of the firms. To take 
this into account, we consider the following random effects model: 
it it it i it u v w c + + + + = x β' ) ( 0 β                         (2) 
where the variables are in logs and  i w  is a time invariant, a firm-specific random 
term that captures company heterogeneity. To estimate the model, the identification 
condition requires the random components of the coefficients to be uncorrelated with   12
the explanatory variables. A second issue concerns the stochastic specification of the 
inefficiency term u. For the latter, we assume a Half-Normal distribution. For the 
estimation of the parameters, we construct the likelihood function using the approach 
proposed by Greene (2004, 2005). 
Under the previous assumptions, the conditional density of cit given  i w is: 
it i it it
it it
i it w c w c f x β' ) (    ,    
2
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where φ  is the standard normal density function, and Φ the respective cumulative 
distribution function. The parameters λ  and σ
2 were defined before. 
Conditional on  i w , the T observations for company i  are independent and, 
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The unconditional joint density is obtained by integrating the heterogeneity 
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The log likelihood, ∑
i
i L log , is then maximised with respect to the 
parameters β0, β, σ, λ and any parameters appearing in the distribution of wi. The 
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we can compute the log likelihood by simulation. Averaging the function given by 
(6) over sufficient draws from the distribution of wi will produce a sufficiently   13
accurate estimate of the integral in (5) to allow estimation of the parameters (see 

































| | 2 1







θ σ λ β β        (7) 
where θ includes the parameters of the distribution of wi and wir is the rth draw for 
observation i (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
 
5. Data and results 
5.1 Data 
To estimate the cost frontier, we used a sample of Argentinean pension funds 
companies, organized in a balanced panel with quarterly data from 1996Q2 to 
2007Q1 (10 companies × 43 quarterly observations = 430 observations). Frontier 
models require the identification of inputs (resources) and outputs (transformation of 
resources). Several criteria can be used. One empirical criterion is data availability. 
Literature surveys can also be taken into account. The last criterion for measurement 
selection is the professional opinions of managers in the industry. In this paper, we 
adopt all three criteria.  
Using the available data, we estimate a stochastic Translog cost function (see 
Varian, 1987). We have transformed the variables according to the description 
column in Table 2. We adopt the traditional log-log specification to allow for the 
possible non-linearity of the frontier.  
 
PLACE TABLE 1 HERE 
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The rationale for using prices of capital-management services and capital-
premises ones is the following: pension funds management companies use 
information to increase the return on their portfolios by shifts in its composition, and 
premises to develop their administrative and commercial activity. Therefore, to 





We estimate a stochastic Translog cost function with three input prices (one price of 
labour and two prices of capital), and two outputs (the number of participants and the 
value of the funds managed). M&A is a dummy variable that is one for pension 
funds management companies that were involved in mergers and acquisitions in the 
period and zero otherwise. Share is the market share of the unit analyzed. 
This cost frontier model is specified as an Error Components Model, 
following Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998), to account for causes of efficiency 
controlled by the management (labour, capital, the number of participants, the value 
of funds, and commissions). The regularity conditions require that the cost function 
be linearly homogeneous, non-decreasing and concave in input prices (Cornes, 
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(8)   15
The specification of the cost function follows microeconomic theory (Varian, 
1987). The costs are regressed in input prices (w) and output descriptors (y), t is a 
time trend, v is a random error which reflects the statistical noise and is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution centred at zero, while u reflects inefficiency and is 
assumed to follow a half-normal distribution. This is the cost frontier model, known 
in Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) as the Error Components Model, as it accounts for 
causes of efficiency controlled by management. 
We have chosen a flexible functional form to avoid imposing unnecessary a 
priori restrictions on the technologies to be estimated. Each explanatory variable is 
divided by its geometric mean. In this way, the Translog can be considered an 
approximation to an unknown function and the first order coefficients can be 
interpreted as the cost elasticities evaluated at the sample geometric mean.  
Table 2 presents the results obtained for the stochastic frontier, under the 
assumption of a Half-Normal distribution. For comparative purposes a non-stochastic 
frontier model and a traditional cost function are estimated. A GAUSS program was 
used for the estimation. 
 
PLACE TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Having estimated two competing Translog models — the homogeneous 
Translog frontier model and the heterogeneous Translog frontier model — the 
Likelihood test enables the selection of the most adequate functional form, which is 
the heterogeneous frontier model in the present case. The Likelihood test is a 
statistical test of goodness of fit between two competing models. It compares models 
with a different number of parameters. Comparing the models, the Likelihood test   16
has a chi-square distribution higher for the heterogeneous frontier than the standard 
frontier. Therefore, we can conclude that the Heterogeneous frontier model better 
describes the data set than the Translog model. 
We also compute the Chi-square statistic that serves as a general specification 
test of adding variables to model. Therefore, we can conclude that the addition of 
variables by the Heterogeneous frontier model is supported by the test, signifying 
that the Heterogeneous frontier better describes the data set. Finally, to decide 
whether the frontier model is better than the cost function, the sigma square and 
lambda variables of the cost frontier model are statistically significant, which means 
that a traditional cost function is unable to capture adequately all dimensions of the 
data set.  
Moreover, the random cost function specified above fits the data well, as both 
the R-squared value and the overall F-statistic from the initial ordinary least-squares 
estimation used to obtain the starting values for the maximum-likelihood estimation 
are higher than the standard cost function, presented for comparative purposes. 
The variables have the expected signs since all price elasticities are positive. 
The costs increase with the trend, but at a decreasing rate, signifying that there were 
no technological improvements driving the costs down during the period. However, 
instead of imposing homogeneity in prices, we have tested it and the hypothesis that 
the cost function is homogeneous in prices is accepted for both estimated cost 
frontiers. Furthermore, the cost increases with the price of factors and with the 
outputs. These are statistically significant coefficients. However, the price of capital-
premises despite being positive is statistically insignificant on the standard frontier, 
but turns out to be statistically significant in the random frontier models. Thus, the 
random frontier better captures the dynamics in this data set. The significant random   17
parameters vary across the sample. The identification of the mean values of random 
parameters means that the price of capital-premises and the number of participants 
are heterogeneous and, therefore, a policy to control costs has to take into account 
the heterogeneous characteristic of the sample. So, a common policy can be defined 
for the sample based on the average values of the homogeneous variables, but no 
common policy can achieve all clusters identified in heterogeneous variables.  
 
5.3 Efficiency Scores 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the time-invariant efficiency scores computed from the 
residuals. Technical efficiency is achieved, in a broad economic sense, by the unit 
which allocates resources without waste, and thus refers to a situation on the frontier. 
Units with a score equal to one are on the frontier, while those with a score lower 
than one are above the cost frontier of best practices. The value of waste is measured 
by the difference between one and the score.  
The cost efficiency is defined as the ratio between the minimum cost and the 
actual cost, so it is defined between 0 and 1. Therefore, the closer to 1, the more 
efficient the pension funds are. Since the dependent variable is in logarithms, it is 
calculated as: 
) u ˆ exp( EC − =   (9) 
where the estimated value of the inefficiency (u ˆ ) is separated from the random error 
term (v ˆ ) using the  Jondrow et al. (1982) formula. 
 
PLACE TABLE 3 HERE 
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The Heterogeneous frontier model displays slightly higher efficiency scores than the 
homogenous frontier, signifying that the homogenous frontier confounds 
heterogeneity with efficiency, Greene (2004, 2005). 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This paper has adopted a random frontier model (Greene 2004, 2005) to analyse the 
technical efficiency of the Argentinean pension funds with a balanced panel and 
quarterly data from 1996Q2 to 2007Q1. The main innovation in our analysis is to 
take into account heterogeneity in the model. Two types of heterogeneity are 
presented in the random frontier model — the observed heterogeneity, related to 
observed attributes of pension funds management companies, and the unobserved 
heterogeneity, related to unobserved attributes. The observed heterogeneity is 
captured by entering the relevant attributes of the pension funds management 
company in the cost function and the unobserved heterogeneity is captured entering 
random terms. This procedure improves both efficiency of estimation and inference. 
Benchmarks are obtained for improving the operations of pension funds management 
companies that perform poorly. 
Our empirical findings suggest the following: first, different policies for the 
different segments of the Argentinean pension funds by heterogeneous variables are 
needed. The model does not identify how many clusters exist in the sample and only 
identifies their heterogeneous nature. However, the Orea and Kumbhakar (2004) 
latent frontier model can be applied to identify the clusters. Second, the cost 
parameters (factor prices and output descriptors) have the theoretical expected 
estimates (Varian, 1976). Third, the price of capital-premises and the number of   19
participants are heterogeneous among the Argentinean pension funds management 
companies. Fourth, M&A is positive and statistically significant, meaning that 
embarking on mergers and acquisitions increases costs. This is an intuitive result. 
Fifth, Share is negative and statistically significant, meaning that market share 
contributes to decreasing costs, probably owing to the economies of scale related to 
it. Finally, the rankings are displayed for the companies analysed. 
How do we explain these rankings? The rankings are explained by the 
relative performance of the companies analysed in terms of inputs and outputs used. 
While there are different strategic options among sectors of an industry, mobility 
impediments imply that not all options are available to every industry, inducing a 
spread of the efficiency scores in the industry. However, the mobility barriers 
between the pension funds affect the degree of competition within the industry and in 
this way, the structure within the industry influences pension funds performance 
(Porter, 1979), inducing the spread of efficiency scores. The resource-based view 
(Rumelt, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) holds that pension funds management companies 
are heterogeneous in relation to the resources and capabilities on which they base 
their strategies. These resources and capabilities may not be perfectly mobile across 
the industry, which results in a competitive advantage for the best-performing 
companies (Barney,1991). Purchasable assets cannot constitute sources of 
sustainable profits because critical resources are not available in the market. Critical 
resources are those which are built and accumulated on the premises of the pension 
funds management companies, their non-imitability and non-substitutability being 
dependent on specific traits of their accumulation process. The difference in 
resources thus results in barriers to imitation (Rumelt, 1991) and companies’ 
inability to alter their accumulated stock of resources over time. In this context,   20
unique assets are seen as exhibiting inherently differentiated levels of efficiency; 
sustainable profits are ultimately a return on the unique assets owned and controlled 
by the pension funds management companies. Therefore, we can conclude that 
different theoretical frameworks can explain the spread of efficiency scores among 
the Argentinean pension funds management companies analysed. 
Policy implications arising from the results are that benchmarking analyses 
are needed to encourage the Argentinean pension funds management companies to 
increase relative efficiency. The improvement should be based on the balance of 
inputs and outputs and increased market share.  
This paper has one limitation related to the data set. As far as the data set is 
concerned, the use of quarterly data samples from Argentinean pension funds 
companies is questionable. Moreover, the data set is short so the conclusions are 
limited. For the latter to be more generalized, a larger panel data set would be 
necessary. Further research would confirm the present results. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Data: 1996Q2 to 2007Q1 
Variable Description  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Standard  deviation 
Log Cost  Logarithm  of 
operational costs in 
pesos at constant prices 
1999=100 
4.649 7.100  5.673  0.510 
Log  PL  Logarithm of price of 
labour, measured by 
dividing total wages by 
the number of workers 
3.251 4.153  3.766  0.167 
Log PK1  -
management 
services 
Logarithm of price of 
capital-management 
services, measured by 
dividing the fixed plus 
variable commissions by 
the value of the pension 
funds under 
management 
0.0009 0.033  0.007  0.006 
Log PK2  -
premises 
Logarithm of price 
capital-premises, 
measured by dividing 
the expenditure on 
equipment and premises 
by  the number of 
premises 
3.461 5.721  4.687  0.454 
Log participants 
(affiliates) 
Logarithm of the 
number of participants 
who are all participants 
including those who are 
currently not 
contributing because of 
unemployment or for 






  0.536 
Log  fund  Logarithm of the value 
of the funds at constant 
pesos   
7.230 10.217  8.966  0.689 
M&A  Dummy variable which 
is one for companies 
involved in Mergers and 
Acquisitions during the 
period 
0 1  0.31 0.46 
Share Market  share  of  the 
companies   0.001 0.27 0.08  0.07 
   29
Table 2: Stochastic Translog Panel Cost Frontier of Argentinean Pension Fund 
Management Companies, 1996Q2 to 2007Q1 (dependent variable: Log Cost) 
 




Non-random parameters  Coefficients (t-
ratio) 
Coefficients (t-ratio) 
Constant 1.038  (5.480)  1.218  (4.219)P 
Trend 0.197  (3.219)*  0.1523  (2.945)* 
Log PL  0.249 (4.610)*  0.286 (3.219)* 
Log  PK1     0.318 (1.216)* 
Log  PK2   0.203 (3.219)*  0.167 (4.034)* 
Log Participants ( affiliates)    0.037 (3.073)* 
Log Fund  0.728 (3.219)  0.543 (2.963)* 
1/2Trend
2  -0.338 (-3.256)  -0.138 (1.054) 
1/2Log PL
2  0.680 (2.232)**  0.582 (3.219)* 
1/2Log  PK1
2 0.138  (1.219)  0.143  (1.037) 
1/2Log  PK2
2 0.219  (1.035)  0.175  (1.012) 
1/2Log participants
2 0.136  (3.032)*  0.128  (4.219)* 
1/2Log Fund
2  0.057 (3.214)*  0.031 (2.567)** 
Trend*Log Pl  0.021 (1.247)  0.023 (2.535)** 
Trend*log PK1  0.004 (1.014)  (0.005 (0.028) 
Trend*Log PK2  0.002 (2.021)  0.001 (1.043) 
Trend*Log Participants  0.012 (3.218)*  0.022 (3.216)* 
Trend*Log Fund  0.035 (1.218)  0.027 (2.214) 
Log PL*Log Pk1  0.136 (1.893)  0.127 (1.031) 
Log PL*Log PK2  -0.219 (-2.126)**  -0.167 (-3.023)* 
Log PL*Log Participants   -0.128 (-0.129)  -0.118 (-1.021) 
Log PL*Log Fund  0.197 (2.219)**  0.174 (1.195) 
LogPK1*LogPK2  0.129 (4.129)*  0.269 (2.045) 
LogPK1*Log Participants   0.271 (4.219)*  0.319 (3.127)* 
LogPK1*Log Fund  -0.571 (-1.712)**  -0.484 (-1.032) 
LogPK2*log Participants (see caveat above)  -0.257 (-2.783)*  -0.319 (-1.784) 
LogPK2*Log Fund  0.217 (3.129)*  0.417 (2.985)* 
Log Participants* Log Fund  1.214 (2.219)**  1.028 (3.127)* 
M&A 0.028  (3.731)*  0.067  (4.894)* 
Share -0.026  (-3.051)  -0.019  (-3.954) 
Mean for Random Parameters   
Log PK1  0.4401 (5.141)*   
Log Participants  0.0228 (3.680)*   
Scale Parameters for Dists. Of Random Parameter   
Log PK1  0.251 (3.672)   
Log Participants  0.532 (4.512)   
[]
2 / 1 2 2
U V σ σ σ + =  
0.222 (4.237)  0.673 (3.894)* 
V U σ σ λ / =   0.522 (12.321)  0.618 (4.219) 
Log likelihood  84.741  81.342 
Chi Square (prob.)  169.48 (0.001)  158.31  (0.001) 
Observations 430  430 
t Statistics in parentheses fall below the parameters; those followed by * are significant at 1% level.    30
 
Table 3. Average Cost Efficiency of Argentinean Pension Fund Management 





Scores  Homogenous Scores
1 Arauca  Bit  0.757  0.612 
2 Consolidar  0.927  0.812 
3 Profesión  0.931  0.845 
4 Futura  0.951  0.902 
5 Previsol  0.963  0.922 
6 Máxima  0.964  0.925 
7 Nación  0.976  0.912 
8 Orígenes  0.996  0.932 
9 Prorrenta  0.999  0.943 
10 Unidos  1  1 
  Mean 0.946  0.881 
  Median 0.964  0.917 
  Std. Dev  0.072  0.108 
 
 
 